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P

opulation-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) has become the American
Army’s new way of war. The principles and ideas that emerged out of the
Army’s counterinsurgency field manual (FM), FM 3-24, published in late 2006,
have become transcendent. The field manual has moved beyond simple Army
doctrine for countering insurgencies to become the defining characteristic of
the Army’s new way of war. In the American Army today, everyone is a counterinsurgent. It is easy to find examples of FM 3-24’s permeating effect in other
Army doctrinal manuals such as FM 3-0, Operations, and FM 3-07, Stability
Operations. Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV, the American Army
general charged with writing the Army’s doctrine, recently stated:
The future is not one of major battles and engagements fought by
armies on battlefields devoid of population; instead, the course of
conflict will be decided by forces operating among the people of the
world. Here, the margin of victory will be measured in far different
terms than the wars of our past. The allegiance, trust, and confidence
of populations will be the final arbiters of success.1

The idea of populations as the prize in war, that they are the focus, is
drawn directly from the pages of FM 3-24.2
In a sense, population-centric counterinsurgency has perverted a better
way of American war which has primarily been one of improvisation and practicality. Over the course of American history there have been strategic shifts in
terms of the threats and enemies that the United States had faced. With each of
these shifts came a different approach, or way, to fighting wars or preparing for
them in peacetime. For example, in the American Civil War, General Ulysses
S. Grant carried out a strategy of exhausting the southern armies through largescale combat. A quarter of a century later in the Philippines, the American Army
improvised and adapted to fight and ultimately defeat an insurgency against the
US colonial government. As historian Brian Linn has shown in criticism of
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Russell Weigley’s classic The American Way of War, the US military’s approach
has not been an ideological one of only wanting to fight wars consisting of
big battles. A close reading of Linn’s work shows that the true American way
of war has been one of adaptation and flexibility, and not a rigid ideological
attachment to seeking out the next Napoleonic battle of Austerlitz.3 Regrettably,
the American Army’s new way of war, otherwise called population-centric
counterinsurgency, has become the only operational tool in the Army’s repertoire to deal with problems of insurgency and instability throughout the world.
Population-centric COIN may be a reasonable operational method to use in
certain circumstances, but it is not a strategy. There are flaws and limitations
that need to be exposed and considered.

A Military Methodology
Population-centric counterinsurgency is a military operation, a
method, nothing more and nothing less. Its ideas and rules of tactics and operations should be familiar to anyone who has studied or thought about various
approaches to COIN. They are:
•• Populations are always the focus, the center of gravity, and they have to
be protected.
•• The enemy insurgent as a rule cannot be as important or given the same
level of emphasis as the population.
•• Population-centric COIN requires patience on the part of the American
people.
•• It demands a certain tactical approach of dispersion into small outposts
to live amongst the people to win their hearts and minds; this has become the
concept of clear, hold, and build.
•• Population-centric counterinsurgency equals nation-building, and it
requires a major investment in time to be successful.
•• Its historical model of success is the British in Malaya.
•• Its supreme historical failure is the United States’ involvement in Vietnam.
•• Its current narrative is that the techniques of population-centric counterinsurgency practiced by several additional combat brigades as part of the Surge
of forces in Iraq produced success after February 2007.
•• Its historical “how-to” text is Counterinsurgency Warfare by a French
Army officer who fought in Algeria, David Galula.
•• Its current set of rules are prescribed in FM 3-24. As the rules dictate, an
Army unit must learn and adapt to improved population-centric tactics and
operations; the unit cannot learn and adapt other methods in place of population-centric counterinsurgency.
Good strategy, however, demands the consideration of alternatives, yet
the American Army’s fixation on population-centric COIN precludes choice.
We may have become adept at appearing to apply Galula’s principles in Iraq
and Afghanistan, but we are not good strategists. Strategy is about choice,
options, and the wisest use of resources in war to achieve policy objectives. Yet
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in the American Army’s new way of war, tactics—that is, the carrying out of
the “way”—have utterly eclipsed strategy.
Nation-building using population-centric COIN as its centerpiece
should be viewed as an operation. It should not be viewed as strategy, or even
policy for that matter. But what is occurring now in Afghanistan, for example,
at least for the American Army, is a “strategy of tactics.” If strategy calls for
nation-building as an operational method to achieve policy objectives, and it
is resourced correctly, then the population-centric approach might make sense.
But because the United States has “principilized” population-centric COIN
into the only way of doing any kind of counterinsurgency, it dictates strategy.

Tactical Orientation
Ironically, the new approach has inverted political scientist Andrew
Krepinevich’s damning criticism of the American Army in his hugely influential but deeply flawed 1986 book, The Army in Vietnam. Krepinevich’s strategy
of tactics argument for Vietnam was that the American Army was so conventionally minded and hidebound that it was unable to see a better way of
population-centric COIN.4 Now the American Army has done the inverse. The
Army is so tactically oriented toward population-centric counterinsurgency
that it cannot think of doing anything else. General Stanley McChrystal’s
recently released command guidance to forces in Afghanistan employs all of
the dictums of population-centric counterinsurgency and confirms this strategy
of tactics. His statement that success in Afghanistan will not be determined by
the number of enemy killed but by the “shielding” of the civilian population
could have easily come out of the pages of FM 3-24, or commander’s talking
points during the Iraq Surge.5
These population-centric COIN principles have been turned into
immutable rules that are dictating strategy in Afghanistan and having a powerful shaping effect on reorganizing the American Army. A few months ago,
when asked about the way ahead for the American military in Afghanistan
and how Iraq was comparable to Afghanistan, General David Petraeus
acknowledged that the two were very different. But the thing to remember,
according to General Petraeus, was that the principles of COIN that the Army
has learned in Iraq over the past couple of years are applicable to Afghanistan.6
Those principles belong to the population-centric COIN methodology.
If we accept that the principles are applicable, then we have already chosen the
way ahead in Afghanistan, which is population-centric nation-building requiring large numbers of American ground combat forces, dispersed into the local
population in an effort to win their hearts and minds away from the insurgent
enemy, and to eventually build a nation.
It is a recipe for a long-term American combat presence in the world’s
troubled spots. At present in the American Army there does not seem to be
any alternatives. The inability to realistically consider alternatives reveals that
the Army has become dogmatic, bound like a Gordian knot to the methods of
population-centric counterinsurgency as the sole solution in Afghanistan and,
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potentially, in any other part of the world where instability and insurgencies
are brewing.7
How did this happen? How did we get to a point where the American
Army has developed a mentality, a worldview, a zeitgeist, of population-centric
counterinsurgency, reflecting the American Army’s new way of war? The
genesis for all of this was the US Army’s experience in Vietnam. The American
Army lost that war, as Krepinevich argued, because under General William
Westmoreland it tried to fight World War II all over again, a conventional
war. The American Army did not understand population-centric COIN, could
only think in terms of conventional warfare, and therefore lost, according to
Krepinevich and others. Derivatives of this argument by author Lewis Sorley
in his book A Better War say there was a radical change between General
Westmoreland and his successor, General Creighton Abrams, and that Abrams
redirected the American Army’s strategy and could have won if the American
people and their policymakers had not lost their will.8
The British counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya is viewed in
a similar way. As the standard understanding goes, just as with the radical
change between Westmoreland and Abrams, so too in Malaya there was a substantial shift in strategy between Generals Harold Briggs and Gerald Templer
with their respective search-and-destroy and hearts-and-minds campaigns.
Briggs, according to the stock explanations, focused too much on large-unit,
conventional operations using search-and-destroy techniques trying to kill
enemy insurgents, or what later commentators referred to as the enemy-centric
approach. But it was Briggs’s replacement, Sir Gerald Templer, who understood
the importance of winning the hearts and minds of the population and shifted
strategy to the classic population-centric counterinsurgency approach utilizing
techniques designed to persuade the population to support the government and
reject the insurgents.9
These historical interpretations have been seriously challenged and in
a number of instances overturned by current historical scholarship. Regarding
Vietnam, American scholars such as Andrew Birtle and Dale Andrade have
shown that there was not a radical change between Westmoreland and Abrams,
and that Westmoreland’s strategy, at least in 1965 when faced with a conventional Communist threat inside South Vietnam, made sense. With regard to
the British in Malaya, new scholarship by British historian Karl Hack strongly
suggests that there was more continuity than discontinuity between Briggs and
Templer and that the insurgency was actually broken during the Briggs years,
not under Templer. Briggs, as this revisionist interpretation argues, based on
newly released primary sources, broke the back of the insurgency through the
use of military force directed against the insurgents, combined with an effective population resettlement program that took away the insurgents’ base of
support.10
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COIN in Iraq
From the history of the Vietnam War, fast forward to the Iraq War and
the beginning of the Surge of forces in February 2007. At that time and even in
the year before, one began to hear arguments that the reason things were going
so badly in Iraq was because the American Army up to the point when the
Surge was initiated did not fully understand how to execute COIN, and in the
early years of the conflict was making the same mistakes it did in Vietnam and
that the British initially made in Malaya. The primary mistake, as this standard
explanation goes, was that the American Army was trying to fight a war of big
battles in the Sunni triangle instead of using the proper approach—to apply
Galula and win hearts and minds.11
In short, the conventionally minded American Army did not prepare
for COIN before the war, did not understand how to execute it once the war
started (except for a few exceptional units such as the 101st Airborne Division
in Mosul, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment in Talafar, or 1st Brigade of the 1st
Armored Division in Ramadi), and this lack of knowledge, experience, and
training caused things to turn out so badly. But then things quickly turned
around in February 2007 with the Surge of forces armed with a new counterinsurgency manual called FM 3-24. Under inspired new leadership the American
Army started doing counterinsurgency correctly.12 Best-known of the books that
have espoused this narrative are Thomas Ricks’s Fiasco and The Gamble, Linda
Robinson’s Tell Me How This Ends, and Kimberly Kagan’s The Surge: A Military
History.13 The triumph narrative associated with the Surge can best be summarized as follows. Prior to the Surge, the conventionally minded Army under
General George Casey, when he was commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq,
had allowed the insurgency to grow and by the end of 2006 had withdrawn
from the rural regions and hunkered down on Forward Operating Bases while
the Iraq civil war raged. But with the Surge, the new commander, General
David Petraeus, armed his army with the new COIN doctrine in the form of
FM 3-24 and deployed American combat forces into major population areas.
Once in these locations, the US Army in Iraq began executing populationcentric COIN correctly; they were able to secure the population, win the hearts
and minds, and from this new position of power the deals cut with the Sons
of Iraq, Moqtada al Sadr’s retreat, and all the other successes flowed from the
population-centric actions of the American Army.14
Consider these historical analogies that appear to perfectly support
such a narrative. In Malaya, the failing Briggs to the successful Templer; in
Vietnam, the anachronistic, conventionally minded Westmoreland to the
enlightened, counterinsurgency-minded Abrams; and in Iraq, the Fulda Gap,
big-battle strategy of Casey to the new way of population-centric counterinsurgency of Petraeus. More recently in Afghanistan, the change between General
David McKiernan and General Stanley McChrystal, with the former being cast
as the general who did not necessarily comprehend America’s new way of war
and was viewed as being a member of the “old school” Army.15
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Quite possibly, the will of the Sunni insurgency broke long before the
Surge went into full effect in the summer of 2007. A combination of brutal
attacks by Shia militia in conjunction with the actions of the Iraqi Shia government and the continuing persecution by al Qaeda against the Sunni community
convinced the insurgents that they could no longer counter all these forces
and it was to their advantage to cut a deal with the Americans. To be sure, the
reduction in violence that began in the summer of 2007 in Iraq had multiple
causes, and the Surge did contribute. But to think that the reduction of violence
was primarily the result of American military action is hubris run amuck.16

Points of Criticism
This combined Malaya, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan War narrative
has turned the American Army’s new counterinsurgency doctrine outlined in
FM 3-24 into an oracle, a cipher that unlocks the keys to success in any counterinsurgency as long as its precepts, principles, and rules are adhered to. But
there are points of criticism to the new doctrine that need to be seriously considered. First, it provides for only one way to counter insurgencies and deal with
the world’s instabilities, and that way is population-centric counterinsurgency.
The manual offers no other alternatives, no other strategies or methodologies.
There is a short five-line paragraph in Chapter 5 that considers more limited
options. That short paragraph should have been turned into half of the manual.
Second, history has shown that insurgencies can be defeated by means
other than the population-centric approach. Consider the recent defeat of the
Tamil Tigers by the Sri Lankan military. Or consider what actually broke the
back of the Malayan insurgency in the early 1950s, which was not so much the
hearts-and-minds persuasion of Templer but the hard-handed use of military
force against civilians, combined with a major resettlement program. FM 3-24
actually serves as a restatement of the counter-Maoist approach to insurgencies
that military officers such as Galula and Sir Robert Thompson developed in
the 1950s and 1960s.17 The end result is a counterinsurgency doctrine that has
become a guiding set of operational principles for today’s American Army
and greater defense establishment. A doctrine based on lessons learned while
combating the FLN insurgents in Algeria, Malaya Communist insurgents, and
other Communist-inspired insurgencies some 50 years ago.
The American Army has become ahistorical in the manner in which
it thinks about counterinsurgency, meaning it has difficulty thinking in a historical context. In a sense, it is as if the world of counterinsurgency warfare
began suddenly around 1945 with the end of World War II and the rise of
the Cold War, along with the numerous people’s wars inspired by nationalism and communism. The term itself “counterinsurgency” is so heavily loaded
with historical context, assumptions, myths, and absurdities that it has become
almost meaningless. A set of case studies of counterinsurgency operations has
been extracted from their historical context and turned into a large historical
trope used to define and judge any small war, imperial war, or insurgency.18
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What is needed to correct this fallacy is for this ahistorical view of
counterinsurgency warfare to be integrated back to its historical context and
combined with a much longer view of small-war history dating to the early
1800s.19 Most worrisome for those concerned with the future of the American
Army is that there has not been a wide-ranging debate over the efficacy and
utility of this new way of war. Between 1976 and 1982, more than 110 published
articles appeared in the professional journal, Military Review, fundamentally
challenging the Army’s doctrine at the time, the Active Defense. There has
been no similar debate following the publication of FM 3-24 almost three
years ago. What has appeared is a series of articles touting the triumph of the
Surge, a narrative that has steamrolled the American Army into accepting this
new way of war.
Some strategists say that if the United States is going to conduct
nation-building, then the population-centric approach is the best. That may be
true, but this article’s thesis is that because this new way of war has become so
dominant, it precludes America’s Army from thinking in other more limited
ways for dealing with instability and insurgencies.
This intellectual straightjacket of population-centric counterinsurgency has had other deleterious effects on the Army. It has pushed America’s
Army and other parts of the American defense establishment into fanciful
thinking. The authors of FM 3-24 declare that counterinsurgency is the
graduate level of warfare. Implicit in this statement is that conventional war
is the undergraduate level. A respected counterinsurgency professional in the
US Army, Colonel Robert Cassidy, said in a widely cited 2004 essay that conducting counterinsurgency warfare was “more difficult” than conventional
war. Another counterinsurgency expert, David Ucko, in a recent book on
what he calls the “new counterinsurgency era,” argues that COIN with all of
its associated political and economic tasks is “far more demanding” than the
relatively simple process of “locating and striking targets.” 20
In fact, COIN is arguably less complex precisely because it is less
“kinetic.” There is very little room for commander or soldier error in highintensity combat. People are killed immediately, and sometimes many of them.
COIN is executed at a slower pace and, thus, can be more forgiving. People
get killed, yes, but far fewer than in fighting at the higher end of the conflict
spectrum; and more importantly in COIN there is a great deal more time to
assess, judge, and decide.

Something Revolutionary?
Counterinsurgency experts in the American defense establishment have
gone to great lengths to turn their new way of war into something revolutionary, something radically different from the past, something more complex and
qualitatively more difficult than what came before.21 The Prussian theorist of
war, Carl von Clausewitz, said that “everything in war is very simple . . . but
the simplest thing is difficult.” To be fair, it is not that COIN or conventional
warfare is the harder or easier. All warfare is demanding and difficult, that
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is why it is called war. In the 1920s, the German Army, as it thought its way
through the lessons of the First World War, understood this point. Under the
leadership of the brilliant German General Hans von Seeckt, they believed that
the nature of war was essentially unchanging even if the means, machines, and
milieu of it do change. Von Seeckt and his officers rejected what they referred
to as any “schema” for war that tried to reduce its nature to a list of principles
and rules.22
The COIN experts seem to believe that they are “young Turks” who
have figured out the true political nature of war compared to the old, conventionally minded American military leaders who did not care about such things
and only wanted to focus on tactics. Since population-centric COIN involves
political activities at low levels such as platoons, companies, and battalions
(for example, establishing village governing councils, etc.), its proponents then
assume that the tactical activities that involve politics in the execution of COIN
mean that those executing this doctrine understand the political nature of war
writ large.23 But in theory, there is nothing more political in a platoon leader in
the Korengal Valley talking to a sheik about local governance then there was
of a rifle platoon leader storming the beach at Normandy. Again, to cite the old
Prussian, “War in all of its action and forms is fundamentally a political act.”
With the new American way of war as population-centric counterinsurgency, the Army has lost track of what has happened to its conventional
warfighting skills. In 2008, three US Army colonels, all former combat brigade
commanders in Iraq, told Army Chief of Staff General George Casey that after
seven years of conducting almost nothing but population-centric counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army’s field artillery branch
had lost its ability to fight and had become a “dead branch walking.” Others
have also expressed concern over the atrophying of core fighting competencies.
Commenting on the widely read Small Wars Journal blog, Major Ike Sallee, an
infantry officer with two combat tours in Iraq, stated:
The Army, if we want to remain a profession, is best served in adhering to core values, principles, and capabilities. If the core is strong .
. . then we are able to transfer capability to other methods. But if we
focus on methods (area-specific tactics, techniques, and procedures)
at the expense of core capabilities (offensive, defensive, protection,
battle drills, marksmanship, physical fitness) we will be chasing our
tails and may find ourselves lacking identity and relevance . . . . If
forced to prioritize (inevitable for the foreseeable future)—focus on
core capabilities . . . what our Army can do exclusively for our Nation.
If we are thrown into a condition requiring counterinsurgency tactics,
we will be able to adapt because of our well-trained competencies.

The essential point and concern expressed by Major Sallee is that an
army’s core capability is to fight at every level of command. If it can do that, it
can do almost anything.24 This is not an argument to stop the focus on COIN
operations, since they are the missions the Army has been assigned by the
nation’s political leaders. The critique of population-centric COIN is a call for
the American Army to honestly look at itself and the risks that it is taking.
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There are indeed risks. History and more recent events show what
happens when armies trained and organized for counterinsurgencies and small
wars have to rapidly adapt to missions at the higher end of the conflict spectrum.
The French Army’s failure in the Franco-Prussian War of 1871 was partly due
to the influence from colonial warfare, as was the British Army’s experience in
the early months of the Second Boer War.
The Israeli Defense Forces’ recent experience in Lebanon is another
good example. There were many reasons for its failure, but one of them, as
validated by scholars and analysts, is that its army had done almost nothing
but COIN in the Palestinian territories, and its ability to fight against a strident
enemy had atrophied. During the past few months a number of studies have
been published on Israel’s 2008 operations in Gaza. What these reports show
is that the Israeli military, especially its army, realized what had happened to
them in Lebanon and took the intervening two years to get back to the basics of
war fighting; critical competencies such as synchronizing fire, maneuver, and
intelligence at all levels of command against a hostile force.25 The American
Army would do well to pay attention to what the Israeli army has undergone in
the past two years.
The COIN zeitgeist has convinced many observers that conventionally
trained and minded armies cannot do counterinsurgency warfare. This belief
is not supported by history. Examples of success are the American Army in
the Philippines, the British Army in Malaya, and the US Army in Vietnam
and moreover in Iraq starting in 2003, not 2007.26 It is dangerous, however, to
think that this principle can operate in reverse, as the example of the Israelis
in Lebanon demonstrates. Imagine how well the drive on Baghdad would
have gone in 2003 if the American Army had spent the majority of its training
time in the years prior learning to talk to sheiks, rebuild schools, or conduct
negotiations.
But the most damaging consequence to the American Army from the
new zeitgeist of COIN is that it has taken the Army’s focus off of strategy.
Currently, US military strategy is really nothing more than a bunch of COIN
principles, massaged into catchy commander’s talking points for the media,
emphasizing winning the hearts and minds and shielding civilians. The result
is a strategy of tactics and principles.

Conclusion
Instead of American Army officers reading the so-called COIN classic
texts of Galula, Thompson, Kitson, and Nagl, they should be reading the history
of the British Empire in the latter half of the nineteenth century. It is in this
period that if they did nothing else right the British Army and government
did understand the value of strategy. They understood the essence of linking
means to ends. In other words, they did not see military operations as ends
in themselves but instead as a means to achieve policy objectives. And they
realized that there were costs that had to be paid.27
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The new American way of war has eclipsed the execution of sound
strategy, producing never-ending campaigns of nation-building and attempts to
change entire societies in places like Afghanistan. One can only guess at the
next spot on the globe for this kind of crusade.28 Former Army officer and writer
Craig Mullaney, who recently penned a book-portrait of himself and what he
learned in combat, said that the “Achilles’ heel for Americans is our lack of
patience.” But perhaps not; perhaps America’s lack of patience in wars like Iraq
and Afghanistan should be seen as a virtue in that it could act as a mechanism
to force the US military to execute strategy in a more efficient and successful
manner. Doing strategy better would leverage the American Army out of its
self-inflicted box of counterinsurgency tactics and methodologies into a more
open assessment of alternatives to current military actions in Afghanistan.
The new American way of war commits the US military to campaigns
of counterinsurgency and nation-building in the world’s troubled spots. In
essence it is total war—how else can one understand it any differently when
COIN experts talk about American power “changing entire societies”—but
it is a total war without the commensurate total support of will and resources
from the American people. This strategic mismatch might prove catastrophic in
the years ahead if the United States cannot figure out how to align means with
ends in a successful strategy. The new American way of war perverts and thus
prevents us from doing so.
The ancient Chinese philosopher of war Sun Tzu had this to say about
the conduct of war and implicitly about its nature:
Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory . . . . Tactics
without strategy is the noise before defeat . . . . There is no instance of
a nation benefitting from prolonged warfare . . . . Speed is the essence
of war.29

The new American way of war—wars amongst the people—has turned Sun
Tzu’s maxim on its head. These days it is customary to think of war and conflict
as prolonged affairs that afflict the farthest-flung precincts of US influence,
thereby demanding a long-term American military presence on the ground. We
are told by the experts that this new way of war requires time, patience, modest
amounts of blood, and vast amounts of treasure. Sun Tzu was highlighting
strategy, and strategy is about choice, options, and the wisest use of resources
in war to achieve political objectives. Yet in the new way of American war,
tactics have buried strategy, and it precludes any options other than an endless
and likely futile struggle to achieve the loyalty of populations that, in the end,
may be peripheral to American interests.
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